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he EU’s economy is a small- and medium-sized
enterprise (SME) economy: 99 percent, or
23 million, of Europe’s enterprises are SMEs and
they provide over 100 million jobs dominating
many growth sectors of the EU economy. In a com-
parative context the statistical importance of SMEs
to the EU’s economy is even more evident. The
average number of employees by size in non-pri-
mary, private enterprises in the EU and USA is
very similar: micro companies employ 3 people in
the EU and 1 in the USA,small companies 19 in the
EU and 20 in the USA,medium 98 and 94 and large
companies 1,052 in the EU and 1,119 in the USA.
But there is a stark difference between the USA
and the EU in terms of the share of total employ-
ment by company size (see Table 1).
Almost twice as many people are likely to be
employed in a very small company in Europe as in
the USA so that the experience of work in the EU
is far more likely to be in a small- and medium-
sized company than a large corporation. Despite
the many publications that have focused on the
various institutional foundations of national capi-
talisms in Europe, it is the SME sector, not the
“national champions”, that do most of the work.
The problem that any SME policy maker has to
address is that it is very hard to find out what
SMEs want.While larger companies have process-
es and hierarchies that help them to define and
represent clear preferences, the
preferences of SMEs are medi-
ated heavily by the channels
that represent their interests
(Dannreuther 1999). After dis-
cussing some of the problems
of SME definition we shall
examine what has driven EU
SME policy over different stages, how easy it is for
the EU Commission to get it wrong, and how some
SME issues are always likely to be beyond the
scope of the EU.
The enigma of the SME
The SME sector is extremely diverse because, by
definition, contingent factors outweigh standardised
ones.This is a serious obstacle to policy formation.It
is the character of the entrepreneur, the sector they
are working in and the general condition of the
economy that influences the prosperity of an SME.It
has therefore become something of a truism that the
SME sector is so heterogeneous that little of univer-
sal value can be said of it (Torrès and Julien 2005).
SMEs tend to be defined as a sector according to
environmental characteristics, such as their national
traditions, corporate status, number of employees
etc. (e.g. Bagnasco and Sabel 1995). Historical
assumptions and institutional persistence often
inform these categories.Some states have long tradi-
tions of support through statutory chambers
(Crossick and Haupt 1995), while others have pro-
vided little support for SMEs until relatively recent-
ly. British governments, for example, did not recog-
nise their small business sector existed until 1972.
Academic research has often distorted the picture
and many myths have been attached to SMEs, such
as their employment generation potential and intrin-
sic innovativeness. One current assumption of SME
policy is that an enterprise economy needs a high
number of small firm births that slightly exceeds a
high number of deaths. This “churn” effect provides
a clear rationale for the dynamism of an SME sector.
But while there has been a lot of research into new
Table 1 
Employment by enterprise size 
 SME  in  % 
 Micro  Small  Medium  Total 
Large in % 
USA (2000)  22  15  12  49  51 
Japan (2001)  na  na  na  67  33 
Europe-19 (2003) 39  17  13  70  30 
na = not available. 
Source: “SMEs in Europe 2003” Observatory of European SMEs 2003, No. 7, p. 33. 
* University of Leeds.firm formation, the social and economic costs of
SME deaths has been hardly explored.
From the mid-1980s, research has focused more on
the social institutions and cultural traits that influ-
ence SME behaviour (Piore and Sabel 1986; Best
1990). The idea of “social capital” grew from this
research and has become a central topic in the dis-
cussion of competitiveness in development and man-
agement literatures. This came closer to the real
experiences of self employment, but often at the
expense of intellectual rigour.The problem of know-
ing what SMEs want remains and while this is so,
SME policies tend to be attached to broader policy
agendas or institutional priorities.
Defining SMEs
For the last twenty years the EU has had to negoti-
ate with national governments and a variety of sec-
toral concerns over its role in SME policy often
with competing notions of what an SME is (Dann-
reuther 1999; 2007). The EU currently defines
SMEs as those companies with fewer than 250 em-
ployees which are independent from larger compa-
nies, with an annual turnover of less than €50 mil-
lion and an annual balance sheet total not exceed-
ing €43 million (European Commission 2003). But
while agreement over this definition has allowed a
large body of statistical data to be collected on the
SME sector, the definition has also changed three
times in fifteen years in response to changes in state
aids policy.
The Commission has observed that “the question
of the appropriate definition of SMEs is meaning-
ful only in the context of a specific measure for
which it is considered necessary to separate one
category of enterprises from others for reasons of
their “size”. The criteria adopted for making this
distinction necessarily depend on the aim pur-
sued” (European Commission 1992, 2). The con-
textual significance of SME definitions has ren-
dered the comparative analysis of SMEs and their
policies difficult. In its wide ranging compendium
of SME policies the OECD observed that “the
empirical basis for informed policy making in the
area of SMEs and entrepreneurship is rather
poor”,blaming a “poor underlying statistical base”
and a “notoriously limited cross-country compara-
bility” that made “the analysis of economic forces
or policies over time more complicated” (OECD
2004, 217).This diversity of data sources is reflect-
ed in the breadth of approaches to small firms in
economic theory (You 1995) and explanations for
their reassertion in the late 1980s (Sengenberger
et al. 1990). Methodologically coherent evalua-
tions of SME policies have been done (Storey
1990; Wren and Storey 2002) but the conflict
between scientific excellence and practical policy
solutions has been an obstacle in the engagement
of researchers with SME policy (Curran and
Storey 2002).
The politics of SME policy are vital to understand-
ing its significance. Traditions surrounding small
firms policies predate the modern capitalism of the
twentieth century (Shonfeld 1965). On the 1st April
1792, for example, shortly after the French Re-
volution, the introduction of the patente or trade
licence heralded the freedom of self establishment
in France (Crossick and Haupt 1995, 30). Much of
what distinguishes regulated capitalism of the
“European” economic model from the “Anglo
American” one has its origins in the histories of
these corporations and guilds.In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century vigorous debates were
held over how the small retailers and petit bour-
geoisie were to be governed. The resolution of this
“social question” has defined Europe’s political
landscape ever since. Key to these issues, however,
was the ability of political actors to define the inter-
ests of the petit bourgeoisie according to agendas
that fit their own interests.Just as the middle classes
were acknowledged as a core but inevitably ill
defined constituency, so too the SME sector has
managed to maintain its importance in part though
its enigmatic status. SME policy is rarely solely
about SMEs.
The three phases of EU SME policy
It is no coincidence that the EU’s SME policy
began immediately after the first direct elections to
the European Parliament. After 20 years of man-
aging an internal market of large national
economies, the Commission had paid only passing
interest to the SME sector.The first phase of SME
policy was introduced through a year long consul-
tation in the European Year of the SME (EYSME)
in 1982 that explicitly engaged with interests
beyond the Brussels village. The Commission’s
1986 SME Action Programme organised these
many debates into two categories of policy:(1) ver-
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tical measures, designed to address a particular
market failing, and (2) horizontal measures to
improve the business environment. These distinc-
tions remain today with the Commission launching
an Action Programme for Administrative
Simplification in 2007 (European Commission
2007a). As well as introducing an important dis-
tinction for SME policy, the focus on the business
environment complemented the free market
rhetoric of the single market programme and pri-
vatisation agenda that was sweeping member
states at that time.Although member states guard-
ed their control over SME policy closely, enter-
prise, free markets and a renewed Europe were
inextricably linked.
In 1990, however, a conference in Avignon asserted
an important distinction between enterprise and
SMEs. SMEs and craft sector companies experi-
enced many aspects of their business life, such as
access to finance, training, administrative obliga-
tions, differently to larger companies. The second
stage of SME policy embraced these differences,
and many others, to develop a policy of promoting
SMEs through more targeted interventions using,
among other instruments, the new Community
Initiatives.This strategy focused on increasing com-
petitiveness through improving the capacity of
SMEs to, for example, innovate or engage in new
research. SME policy was increasingly concerned
with improving the coordination of existing mea-
sures in the 1994 Integrated Programme. It was also
concerned with linking SME policy to broader
objectives in the EU. The Competitiveness White
Paper emphasised the role SMEs played in innova-
tion (European Commission 1993), while the
European Employment Strategy promoted entre-
preneurship and self employment as a key measure
for addressing unemployment in the EU (European
Council 1997).
The final phase can be seen as the centralising of
SME policy within the continual reform agenda of
the Lisbon process. Immediately after the European
Council launched the Lisbon process as the EU’s
response to globalisation in 2000, the Heads of
Government agreed the SME Charter in Santa
Feira. This specified a range of policy commitments
for member states to respond to, such as entrepre-
neurship and education and decreasing start-up
times, and was designed to promote the sharing of
good practice between member states (European
Commission 2007b). The promotion of entrepre-
neurship would be more actively carried out after a
Green Paper on Entrepreneurship and there would
be better communication with the Commission
through an SME envoy.
While SMEs were of increasing interest on the
international stage, with the OECD’s Bologna dec-
laration on SMEs signed the same year, the signifi-
cance of Santa Feira was in the parallels that it made
with SME policy more broadly. The Lisbon process
incorporated a method of policy making (the open
method of coordination) that was very similar to the
EYSME in its transparency and breadth of engage-
ment.The use of benchmarks that set agreed targets
but maintained national control over implementa-
tion also paralleled SME policy.Finally there were a
number of other horizontal measures that fitted the
specific agenda of SMEs.These included better reg-
ulation, “active” labour market policies, and pro-
moting innovation. Notably these all survived the
critical Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon process
conducted by Wim Kok, and the SME Charter was
presented as an important success of the Lisbon
process.
These three phases show how SME policy has gone
from nothing to a core, even definitive, element of
the EU’s political economy (Dannreuther 2006).The
fundamental nature of this relationship to the EU
has become increasingly clear as social partners and
civil society have become involved in policy imple-
mentation of the new Lisbon process and as cross
party support for SME policy has become a consen-
sus issue in so many areas of policy. One hundred
years ago this was exactly the engagement that
nation states were having with their petit bourgeois
sectors in the social question. Perhaps ex-Commis-
sion President Jacques Delors, who was on the
European Parliament committee that proposed the
EYSME, was aware of this when he wrote a piece
with the title “De la question sociale en France a
l’Europe” (Delors 2001).
SMEs, the knowledge based economy and the 
Service Directive
The knowledge-based economy (KBE) epitomises
the progressive view of an SME economy. High-
skilled flexible workers add value through services
such as advertising, high-technology products,
design and marketing to enable the EU to com-
pete against the low manufacturing wage econo-mies of the South. It has received significant sup-
port as a concept and in tangible policy.Significant
investment has been made through the EU’s
Framework Programmes to improve the quality of
knowledge available. The dissemination of this
knowledge to SMEs has been actively promoted
by encouraging their direct participation or
through other incentives, such as encouraging
spin-off companies from universities through state
aids exemptions. One third of the Commission’s
new “Competitiveness and Innovation Framework
Programme” (CIP) is dedicated to an “Entrepre-
neurship and Innovation Programme” (EIP)
designed to improve the environment for SME
innovation. Between 2007 and 2013 a sum of €2.17
billion will provide better access to finance for
SMEs through venture capital and loan guaran-
tees,a network of regional innovation support ser-
vices as well as promoting the idea of entrepre-
neurship and innovation through policy and pub-
licity (European Commission 2007c).
Much of the success of the KBE has been seen in
the growth of the EU’s service sector economy. In
2003 business services added 26.5 percent of value
to non-financial services, employed 26.2 percent of
the non-financial services workforce and generated
€703 billion in value added (EUROSTAT 2006).An
OECD report suggested that the “… services sector
is by far the largest sector of economic activity in
the euro area.In 2003 it accounted for 58 percent of
business sector value added, 68 percent of total
employment and two-thirds of total output” (Vogt
2005, 1). In addition to specific interventions in
finance and innovation, the EU also sought to
improve the regulatory environment for the sector.
A key aspect of the Lisbon process, and the UK
Presidency, was therefore to maximise this through
an internal market in services. The Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Analysis (CPB) quantified
the effect of a single market in services suggesting
that it would lead to increased investment in com-
mercial services “in the range of 30 percent to
60 percent and the stock of foreign direct invest-
ment could [sic] increase by 20 percent to 35 per-
cent” (CPB 2005, 1).
The Service Directive was fairly typical in its origins.
The Commission’s proposal linked it to SMEs
through Article 47 (2) EC that provided for the right
of establishment which it applied to services using
Article 55. In addition to this strong legal basis, the
Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein pre-
sented a report on the service sector in 2002 that
revealed legal barriers to the establishment of ser-
vice providers, and to the promotion, distribution,
sale and after sale of services (European Commis-
sion 2002). It argued that this reflected a mistrust
and protectionism between the member states and
had a detrimental impact on the European economy,
making victims of small firms and consumers and
undermining the credibility of the internal market by
encouraging black market behaviour.
As a framing directive the proposal did not deal with
all issues but focused on those important to promot-
ing the end goal of an internal market in services.An
important part of the directive is what it does not
address through derogations and codes of conduct
for self-regulation. This was a technique that had
been developed and used broadly for the completion
of the single market. It also introduced a principle
which, like the principle of mutual recognition,
would facilitate the extension of a market in services
with minimal regulation. The “Country of Origin
Principle” allowed firms to trade in services in
another state as long as they complied with the reg-
ulatory obligations of their home economy. It was
specifically intended to “achieve the objective of
guaranteeing the free movement of services whilst
allowing the various national regimes to co-exist
with all their distinctive characteristics” (European
Commission 2004, 18).
The political response to the proposal was immedi-
ate, broad and hostile. Belgian Socialist Ministers
Rudy Demotte (social affairs) and Frank Vanden-
broucke (employment) both challenged the directive
supporting protests that attracted between 50,000 to
70,000 people in June 2004 in Belgium, only three
months after the initial proposal. Carlos Polenus,
vice-president of the BBTK, the Belgian employees’
union, highlighted how the Directive went to the
heart of long standing domestic social compromises:
“Polish employees can be sent by a Czech temporary
agency to a Belgian small or medium-sized enter-
prise that works for a large firm. That temporary
agency can hire people in any EU member state and
put them to work.In Belgium,it will not be required
to pay the Belgian minimum wage.The Belgian tem-
porary employment sector works on the basis of the
principle of equal pay: temporary employees receive
the same wages as permanent employees in the com-
panies where they work temporarily. Bolkestein has
not incorporated this rule into his text” (De
Standaard 2004).
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The Directive had failed not only to propose a work-
able plan but had not engaged sufficiently with the
interests of civil society that it would affect most
directly. Opposition came from all over Europe, uni-
fying left and right in their opposition.This was most
noticeable in France where the Bolkestein Directive
was presented as an example of the free market lib-
eralism that was undermining French tradition. It
played a central role in the No vote campaign that
rejected the EU Constitution: “The Directive sym-
bolised further unemployment,less social protection
for French workers and a threat to France’s social
model. Thus “Polish plumbers” and others in the
enlarged EU who might take over or undercut
“French jobs” at home and abroad featured promi-
nently in the No campaign, which focused strongly
on the defence of public sector services in France”
(Hainsworth 2006, 103–104).
While French and British politicians lost credibility,
the European Parliament orchestrated a review and
new set of proposals that would eventually save the
directive. The Country of Origin Principle was re-
placed with a “Freedom to Provide Services”.
Services of a general interest were only included if
member states chose them to be,and workers’ rights
took precedence over the Directive. Regulating the
knowledge economy would require far more politi-
cal sensitivity to domestic political concerns than the
single market mechanisms traditionally employed by
the Commission.Because of their heterogeneity,ser-
vice sector SMEs would also not fall behind the lead-
ership of their governments. Only the European
Parliament was able to effectively engage the
breadth of opinion needed to formulate a workable
solution.
National versus EU level governance
As with many areas of EU policy, the pendulum has
swung between European and national competences
in SME policy. It is perhaps interesting to see how
specific areas of policy have been retained at the
national level and in what form they have been
affected by the European level.
Tax policy has historically incited a passionate
response from the SME sector (Crossick and Haupt
1995).The Federation of Small Businesses, the UK’s
largest SME representative group, was set up in
response to a letter complaining about value added
tax that was introduced as a condition of UK acces-
sion to the EEC. Member states have, therefore,
been shy about harmonising tax regimes and have
defended unanimity in tax policy making,despite the
potential and real effect they could have on compa-
ny performance.The EU tended to restrict its actions
to areas where individual Member States could not
provide an effective solution such as providing cross-
national comparisons and identifying harmful taxa-
tion.The Commission also introduced a pilot project
on “Home State Taxation” that would allow SMEs
engaged in cross-border trading to calculate taxable
profits in all countries according to the tax rules in
their home country. This would reduce compliance
costs for the firm and allow taxable income to be
apportioned between the countries (European
Commission 2005a). However, it did not receive
member state support. Tax incentives to invest in
SMEs are also often defended because they are
often extremely helpful as a vehicle for other means.
Various schemes in the UK have enabled investors
to benefit as the current controversy over private
equity investment schemes demonstrates.
Industrial policy has long been an area allied with
the discretion and patronage of member states and
one that has often benefited SMEs. As a potential
distortion to competition, state aids have been
closely regulated by the Commission. But SMEs
have always benefited from de minimis exemp-
tions, which is why the definition of an SME has
changed so regularly over the years. Substantial
resources have been directed to SMEs through
industrial policies that have administered cheap or
long-term credit,direct incentives and subsidies for
employment and training and fixed capital invest-
ments. The linking of SMEs with vague notions of
competitiveness (Krugman 1994) has only added
to the range of interventions that they have bene-
fited from. Combined with the poor economic
growth of the single market programme, France
and Germany have actively promoted more defen-
sive industrial policies at the EU level (McGuire
2006). While the industrial policy at the EU level
has developed sectoral dimension for seven sec-
tors, its main focus has been to promote horizontal
measures through policies familiar to SME policy.
The policy fits within the Lisbon agenda to create
better framework conditions for manufacturing
industries and includes the New Legislative
Simplification Program [2005 to 2008] (Commis-
sion 2005, 2). Industrial policy for SMEs will
remain an area in which member state implemen-
tation prevails over EU level legislation.Conclusion
The spectacular growth in interest in policy for EU
SMEs is explicable by the linking of the policy to
broader agendas. Initially benefiting from the ideo-
logical interest in enterprise in the 1980s, SME poli-
cy became increasingly pragmatic as it was linked to
other policy agendas and is now central to the
Lisbon reform process. Some areas of policy do
appear to be beyond the EU due to the sensitive
nature of the political compromise or the inability of
the EU to offer sufficient incentives to compensate
for change. In the case of the Service Directive, the
Commission also demonstrated that it was capable
of making hugely inappropriate political judgements
about the needs of its SMEs and service sector.
At a superficial level, SME policy appears to be a
mess of measures that have been tagged onto other
more strategically coherent agendas. But this denies
both the significance and the importance of the EU’s
attempts to engage with its SME population. All
states find this a difficult relationship to manage as
the heterogeneity of the sector imposes uncertainty.
Now that SMEs are at the centre of the EU’s reform
process there is every chance that it may engage
more directly with its citizens and propose more
modest and realistic policies.
SME policy is interesting because it describes the
boundary between the state and the economy and in
order to claim its legitimacy as political actor, the
EU has to address this boundary. But this is also a
risky political endeavour and more sparks will fly as
the EU encroaches onto such a sensitive area of
national economic policy.
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